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Abstract
This paper focuses on the size of the borrower group in group lending. We show that, when social ties
in a community enhance borrowersincentives to exert e¤ort, a prot-maximizing nancier chooses a group
of limited size. Borrowers that would be fundable under moral hazard but have insu¢ cient social ties do
not receive funding. The result arises because there is a trade-o¤ between raising prots through increased
group size and providing incentives for borrowers with less social ties. The result may explain why many
micro-lending institutions and rural credit cooperatives lend to groups of small size.
Keywords : Group Lending; Moral Hazard; Social Capital.
JEL Classication : D8; G2.
1 Introduction
Group lending is an unconventional lending arrangement that has been successfully applied to provide credit to
poor people in low income communities. The special feature is that loans are allocated individually to group
members, but all members face consequences if one cannot full repayment obligations. Such joint liability
arrangements are e¤ective in dealing with asymmetric information problems, enhancing the availability of credit
for poor borrowers that traditional commercial banks would not have as customers (Ghatak and Guinnane,
1999). This paper contributes to the literature by developing a simple model of group lending to address the
issue of optimal group size.
The idea behind group lending is that people with connections based on geographical proximity or shared
norms may be able to meet contractual obligations that would be impossible under conventional banking agree-
ments. Members of a community may have knowledge of each others types, projects, and actions. Furthermore,
they may inict non-nancial sanctions on delinquent borrowers. The e¤ects of potential retribution on borrow-
ersincentives to repay may depend on the strength of social ties among community members.
Although the majority of todays joint liability lending institutions are micronance institutions like the
well-known Grameen Bank in Bangladesh or BancoSol in Bolivia, the traditions of group lending date back to
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the mid-19th century when the German rural credit cooperatives were established.1 An important feature for
both lending institutions has been that the borrowers lived in small rural communities, interacted frequently,
and belonged to groups organized on the basis of di¤erent economic and social ties.
Group lending institutions di¤er in the size of the borrower group. At the turn of the 20th century, most rural
credit cooperatives in Germany used to lend to groups of between 75 and 250 members (Ghatak and Guinnane,
1999). The Grameen bank in Bangladesh is known of its preference towards small groups of ve members.2
FINCA lends to borrower groups of between 10 and 50 members.3 Devereux and Fishe (1993) argue that, in the
Dominican Republic, small group size is an important feature of successful micro-lending programs.
In this paper, we focus on the equilibrium size of the borrower group from the perspective of a prot-
maximizing nancier. We present a model where social ties a¤ect incentives to exert e¤ort on borrowers
individual projects under moral hazard. In particular, we assume that every borrower can be characterized by
a level of social capital that represents the strength of the borrowers social attachment to the community she is
part of. Borrowers with a higher level of social capital are easier to provide incentives to work. This may be the
case because borrowers with strong social ties are more sensitive to non-nancial sanctions than borrowers less
attached to their community. Social ties are therefore important but the model does not require that borrowers
are jointly liable for the loan. We show the existence of an optimal group size determined by the level of social
capital of the marginal borrower that is eligible for funding under moral hazard. Our result suggests that if
the group is chosen to maximize the nanciers prots, group size is limited: it depends on the strength of the
borrowers social ties whether the borrower becomes part of the group. We show that the chosen group size
increases in the projects prot potential and decreases in the expected agency cost the nancier is required to
pay to compensate borrowers for their e¤orts.
In our model, group size has two countervailing e¤ects on the nanciers prots. An increase in group
size increases the banks customer base and thus the amount of capital to lend and prots. On the other
hand, increasing group size entails the involvement of borrowers with less social capital. Compensation of those
borrowers requires the nancier needs to pay agency costs, which reduces prots. We show that there exists a
threshold level of social capital such that borrowers with social ties below this threshold will not be included in
the group. The nancier is interested in increasing group size up to the point where agency costs are too high to
do so. Consequently, agency costs together with borrowersheterogeneity in terms of social ties su¢ ce to show
that the number of borrowers in the group is limited.
The theoretical literature on group lending has mainly focused on the e¤ect of joint liability on group
membersrepayment incentives. Besley and Coate (1995) show that the possibility of imposing social sanctions
decreases group membersincentives to default. Ghatak (2000) argues that joint liability lending can be used as a
screening device through the instrument of peer selection.4 Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) provide a comprehensive
analysis on how joint liability lending may mitigate information and enforcement problems in communities with
1An important di¤erence between the two types of organizations is that while micronance institutions obtain most of their
lending capital from external nancial institutions, in credit cooperatives memberscapital contributions represent a major source
of funding.
2Those ve borrowers are, however, part of a group of forty borrowers who meet frequently.
3Our model applies to situations where social ties exist between members of the borrower group. In FINCA groups, members
are selected by the organization, rather than being self-selected. Nevertheless, as Karlan (2007) points out, social ties exist within
the groups.
4Other important papers adressing adverse selection issues in group lending include Armendariz de Aghion and Gollier (2000),
La¤ont and NGuessan (2000), and La¤ont (2003).
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strong social ties. We contribute to this literature by showing, in a framework without joint liability but with
socially connected borrowers, that moral hazard considerations impose an upper limit on group size.
In the spirit of our model, Jaunaux and Venet (2009) show that social pressure may a¤ect incentives through
the assignment of individual loan guarantors to borrowersprojects. Screening borrowers through such mecha-
nism may limit group size. The social pressure in our model also limits optimal group size but our mechanism
relies on an agency cost argument.
The next section describes the basic model and our main result. Section 2 and 3 consider robustness issues.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Basic Model
Consider the problem of a nancier engaged in lending to a group of nancially constrained borrowers. Borrowers
are subject to moral hazard and di¤er in terms of the level of social and nancial capital they possess. Each
borrower rst decides whether to invest in a project that requires investment I. The investment project yields R
in case of success and 0 in case of failure. If the borrower exerts e¤ort on her project, the probability of success is
pH . If the borrower does not exert e¤ort, the probability of success is pL and the borrower derives private benet
of size sB. Hence, the opportunity cost of working depends on the borrowers social capital (1  s). A borrower
with a higher level of social capital obtains lower private benets when shirking. This assumption captures the
idea that borrowers with strong within-group social ties are easily punished by non-nancial sanctions.5 We
assume that s is uniformly distributed on the interval [0; 1]. Each borrower has a specic amount of nancial
capital A, where A is uniformly distributed on the interval

0; A

. The nancier requires a gross return (1 + i)
on the investment.
Finally, we assume that the nancier has information on borrowerslevel of social capital.6
The borrower exerts e¤ort if the incentive compatibility constraint holds.
pHRb  pLRb + sB
() Rb  sB
p
(1)
The nanciers participation constraint and the condition for nancing can be written as:
pH (R Rb)  (1 + i) (I  A) ;
A  I   pH
R  sBp
(1 + i)
= A(s) (2)
The nancier may provide funding for every project that satises the nancing condition. Notice that A (s)
is increasing in s and therefore decreasing in borrowerssocial capital.
5The fear of being socially sanctioned may enhance borrowersincentives. Indeed, Gine and Karlan (2011) point out that "many
clients repay not out of social pressure, but rather out of concern for their social reputation." Furthermore, borrowers may derive a
utility loss when deceiving other community members. Research on behavioral economics suggests that there exists a psychological
cost of lying or shirking arising from peoples aversion to deceiving others (Gneezy 2005).
6This assumption is not unrealistic: in most group lending programs, the nancier is represented through the presence of a
local loan o¢ cer at the weekly meetings of group members. The loan o¢ cer is in continuous relationship with the borrowers and
thus obtains information on community members creditworthiness. As a result of regular meetings between the loan o¢ cer and
community members, personal relationships between them may develop. Woolcock (1999) points out that the Grameen Bank loan
o¢ cers tend to be asked to serve as marriage counselors, conict negotiators, and civic leaders in the community.
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We denote the nanciers prots by . Since s is uniformly distributed on [0; 1] ; we can write  as a function
of the level of social capital of the marginal borrower that can be funded under moral hazard, bs.
 = (1 + i)
bsZ
0
[I  A(s)] Pr [A(bs)  A  A(1)] ds (3)
In what follows, we denote the nanciers equilibrium choice of the banks customer base by s and refer to
s as the optimal group size. The following proposition states that a prot-maximizing nancier chooses the
banks customer base such that s < 1.
Proposition 1 There exists a level of social capital s 2 (0; 1) that maximizes the nanciers prots and thereby
denes the optimal size of the borrower group. The optimal size of the group increases in the projects expected
prot potential pHR and decreases in the expected agency cost to be paid to borrowers
pHB
p .
The proposition suggests that group size is limited: a prot-maximizing nancier does not provide nancial
capital to all borrowers that are fundable under moral hazard.7 To maximize prots, the nancier aims at
increasing the amount of capital to be lent by including a larger number of borrowers in the group.8 Providing
funding to borrowers with low social capital will however decrease prots because of the inherent moral hazard
problem. The nancier has a trade-o¤ between raising prots by increasing group size and paying a high agency
rent to socially less connected borrowers. The high agency cost to be paid to borrowers with low social capital
makes the nancier choose the size of the group in a manner that not all borrowers that would otherwise be
fundable, even under moral hazard, may realize their investment projects. The result is in line with Devereux
and Fishe (1993) suggesting that the borrower group must be composed of fairly homogenous individuals.
Our results also suggest an explanation for the di¤erence in group size across group lending institutions.
Optimal group size increases in the prot potential of the borrowersprojects. This may explain the di¤erence
in size, for instance, between the German credit cooperatives and todays micronance institutions. It is well
known that micronance institutions provide loans for borrowers with tiny projects. The implication of our
model in this respect is that micronance loans should be o¤ered to groups of small size. The average (relative)
size of agricultural projects owned by cooperative members tends to be typically larger. Larger size projects, in
our model, allow for the set-up of larger groups.
Finally, our ndings have empirical predictions concerning the size of groups in areas with di¤erent population
densities and in more urban versus more rural areas. Indeed, the micronance literature documents that low
levels of population density and more urban areas are associated with less social ties. In our framework, a
rural and more densely populated area may thus be interpreted as a community in which borrowers have lower
private benets of shirking and consequently require lower agency costs. As optimal group size decreases with
the agency costs, our model predicts that groups should be of larger size in rural and more densely populated
areas.
7This is consistent with lending practices of the historical German cooperatives. Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) cite examples of
German credit cooperatives that denied loans to their members.
8The nanciers incentive to increase group size arises in this model as a result of economics of scale considerations rather than
the correlation across the return realizations of borrowersprojects.
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3 Financiers Information Advantage
In this section, we extend the basic model of section 2 and show that our result holds for a more general model
set-up where the nancier obtains information about project quality. The borrower has no ability to assess the
quality of her project.
We assume that, before the borrower exerts e¤ort, the nancier observes information about the projects
payo¤ perspectives. Assume that for any project, the ex-ante probability of a good payo¤ perspective is . The
nancier observes the state of the project with probability (1  q).9 When payo¤ perspectives are good, the
borrowers e¤ort does not matter the project will succeed. When payo¤ perspectives are bad, the borrower
needs to exert e¤ort to achieve a high success probability.
The borrowers incentive constraint is thus as follows.
(1  ) pHRB  (1  ) pLRB + (1  ) sB
() Rb  sB
p
(4)
The nanciers participation constraint and the nancing condition are:
[ + (1  ) pH ]R 

q ( + (1  ) pH) sB
p
+ (1  q) (1  ) pH sB
p

 (1 + i) (I  A)
() A  I  
[ + (1  ) pH ]R  ((1  ) pH + q) sBp
(1 + i)
= A(s) (5)
The following proposition states that the result obtained in section 2 is robust to the introduction of asym-
metric information into the basic model.
Proposition 2 Assume the nancier has information about project quality unattainable for the borrower. Even
under this assumption, there exists a level of social capital se 2 (0; 1) that maximizes the nanciers prots and
thereby denes the optimal size of the borrower group. The optimal size of the group se increases in the expected
revenues of the project [ + (1  ) pH ]R and decreases in the expected agency cost
h
((1  ) pH + q) Bp
i
.
4 Robustness
In previous sections, we assumed that borrowersnancial A capital was uniformly distributed on the interval
0; A

. We now consider the robustness of our results by assuming a general distribution function for A.
We assume that each borrower has a specic amount of nancial capital A, where A is distributed on [0; A(1)],
with a cumulative distribution function F and a density function f(:). For this distribution, we require that the
monotone hazard rate assumption holds: [1 F (:)]f(:) is non-increasing.
The following Proposition states that our main result is robust to the introduction of a general distribution
function.
Proposition 3 Assume a general distribution function for borrowersnancial capital A. There exists a level
of social capital bsg 2 (0; 1) that maximizes the nanciers prots and thereby denes optimal group size. The
optimal size of the group increases in expected project revenues and decreases in the expected agency cost to be
paid to borrowers.
9Another interpretation would be that the nancier is able to monitor borrowers with an imperfect monitoring technology.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we focused on group lending from the perspective of a prot-maximizing nancier. We showed
that when social ties in a community a¤ect borrowers incentives to work the optimal size of the group the
nancier lends to is limited. A prot-maximizing nancier chooses the size of the borrowing group in a way that
borrowers that would be fundable under moral hazard but have insu¢ cient social ties do not receive funding.
Consequently, the size of the borrowing group chosen by the nancier is limited. The result arises because both
social and nancial capital matter for the funding of nancially constrained borrowers: the nancier faces a trade-
o¤ between raising the size of the bank and providing incentives for borrowers with limited social connections.
The result may explain why many micro-lending institutions and rural credit cooperatives lend to groups of
small size.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Given the nancing condition dened in (2), we write the amount of capital to be
lent as a function of the level of social capital of the marginal borrower that can be funded under moral hazard,bs.
 = (1 + i)
bsZ
0
[I  A(s)] Pr [A(bs)  A  A(1)] ds
= (1 + i) (F [A(1)]  F [A(bs)]) bsZ
0
[I  A(s)] ds
=
 
pHRbs  (bs)2
2
pHB
p
!
(F [A(1)]  F [A(bs)]) (6)
The nancier will choose the size of the group by maximizing the amount of capital to be lent and thereby
prots. Since A is uniformly distributed on

0; A

, we can write ddbs as follows:
d
dbs =
0@ (1 + i) [I  A(bs)] (F [A(1)]  F [A(bs)])
 bs hI  A(bs) + 1(1+i) bs2 pHBp i pHBp f [A(bs)]
1A
=
1
A
0@ (1 + i) [I  A(bs)] [A(1) A(bs)]
 bs hI  A(bs) + 1(1+i) bs2 pHBp i Bp
1A
=
1
A
0@ [I  A(bs)] (1  bs) pHBp
 bs hI  A(bs) + 1(1+i) bs2 pHBp i pHBp
1A (7)
6
Solving for the optimal size of the group s :
d
dbs =
0@ [I  A(bs)] (1  bs)
 bs hI  A(bs) + 1(1+i) bs2 pHBp i
1A = 0
()
 
[I  A(bs)] (1  2bs)  1
(1 + i)
(bs)2
2
pHB
p
!
= 0
()
 
1
(1 + i)

pH

R  bsB
p

(1  2bs)  1
(1 + i)
(bs)2
2
pHB
p
!
= 0
() pHR  bs2pHR+ pHB
p

+
3
2
pHB
p
(bs)2 = 0 (8)
The above expression is a second degree polynomial ax2 + bx+ c = 0; with a  0; b  0 and c  0: We therefore
have 2 positive roots. Moreover, this polynomial is positive for bs = 0; and negative for bs = 1. Indeed:
d
dbs (bs = 0) = 1A 1(1 + i)pHR > 0 (9)
d
dbs (bs = 1) = 1A 1(1 + i)pH

1
2
B
p
 R

=
1
A

A

1
2

  I

< 0: (10)
Let s be the lowest root of this polynomial, ddbs is positive for all bs 2 [0; s] and negative for all bs 2 [s; 1]. Since
 is concave in bs, s is a maximum of the function (bs). Indeed,
d2
dbs2 =  2pHR  pHBp + 3pHBp s =  2

pHR  spHB
p

  pHB
p
(1  s)  0 (11)
Using equation (8) in the proof of Proposition 1 we dene the optimal size of the group s, as follows:
s =

2pHR+
pHB
p

 
r
2pHR+
pHB
p
2
  6pHBp pHR
3 Bp
() s = 1
3
0B@"2pHRpHB
p
+ 1
#
 
vuut"2pHR
pHB
p
+ 1
#2
  2pHR
pHB
p
1CA
() s = 1
3
0B@"2pHRpHB
p
+ 1
#
 
vuut4"pHR
pHB
p
#2
+ 1
1CA
() s = 1
3

2y + 1 
q
[2y + 1]
2   2y

=
1
3

2y + 1 
p
4y2 + 1

(12)
where y = pHRpHB
p
.
@s
@y
=
1
3
 
2  4yp
4y2 + 1
!
=
2
3
0BBBB@1 
2 pHRpHB
ps
4

pHR
pHB
p
2
+ 1
1CCCCA  0 (13)
Therefore, @s

@y  0: The result follows.
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Proof of Proposition 2. Given the nancing condition dened in (5), we write the amount of capital to be
lent as a function of the level of social capital of the marginal borrower that can be funded under moral hazard,bs. If s is uniformly distributed on [0; 1] ; we have:
 = (1 + i)
bsZ
0
[I  A(s)] Pr [A(bs)  A  A(1)] ds
=
 
[ + (1  ) pH ]Rbs  ((1  ) pH + q) (bs)2
2
B
p
!
(F [A(1)]  F [A(bs)]) (14)
Again, nancier chooses the size of the group by maximizing the amount of capital to be lent and thereby prots.
The results are therefore the same as in Proposition 1 replacing the expected revenues of the project pHR by
[ + (1  ) pH ]R and the expected agency cost to be paid to the borrower Bp by ((1  ) pH + q) Bp .
Proof of Proposition 3. The optimal group size is dened by the following condition:
d
dbs =
0@ (1 + i) [I  A(bs)] (F [A(1)]  F [A(bs)])
 bs hI  A(bs) + 1(1+i) bs2 ((1 )pH+q)Bp i ((1 )pH+q)Bp f [A(bs)]
1A = 0
()
0@ (1+i)[1 F (A(bs))]((1 )pH+q)Bp f [A(bs)]
 
hbs+ 1(1+i) (bs)22[I A(bs)] ((1 )pH+q)Bp i
1A = 0 (15)
By assumption: dds

[1 F (A(bs))]
f(A(bs))

 0 and dds

(bs)2
[I A(bs)]

=
2bs[I A(bs)]+ 1
(1+i)
((1 )pH+q)B
p (bs)2
[I A(bs)]2  0: This implies that
that  is concave in bs: Moreover:
d
dbs (bs = 0) = [I  A(0)] [1  F (A(0))] > 0 (16)
d
dbs (bs = 1) =  

I  A(1
2
)

((1  ) pH + q)B
p
f (A(1)) < 0 (17)
This implies that the equation ddbs = 0 admits a unique solution sr on [0; 1] : If we denote by E (R) ; the expected
project revenues and by E (B) ; the expected agency cost to be paid to borrowers, we obtain:
d
dbs =
 
[E (R)  bsE (B)] (1  F [A(bs)])
  1(1+i)bs [E (R)  bsE (B)] + bs2E (B)E (B) f [A(bs)]
!
= 0 (18)
Using the implicit function theorem, we have:
dsr
dE (R)
=  
d2
dbsdE(R)
d2
dbs2 =  
(1  F [A(bs)])  1(1+i) [E (R)  bsE (B)]E (B) f [A(bs)]
d2
dbs2  0 (19)
dsr
dE (B)
=  
d2
dbsdE(B)
d2
dbs2 =  
 bs (1  F [A(bs)])  1(1+i) [E (R)  bsE (B)]E (B) f [A(bs)]
d2
dbs2  0 (20)
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